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Abstract 
We study the effect of firing threats in a virtual workplace that reproduces features of 
existing organizations. We show that organizations in which bosses can fire up to one 
third of their workforce produce twice as much as organizations for which firing is 
not possible. Firing threats sharply decrease on-the-job leisure. Nevertheless, 
organizations endowed with firing threats underperformed those using individual 
incentives. In the presence of firing threats, employees engage in impression 
management activities to be seen as hard-working individuals in line with our model. 
Finally, production levels dropped substantially when the threat of being fired was 
removed, whereas on-the-job leisure surged. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In settings in which employers are unable to provide individual incentives to workers, the 
threat of being fired becomes an essential feature of an employment contract (Becker and Stigler, 
(1974), Klein and Leffler, (1981), Shapiro and Stiglitz, (1984), MacLeod and Malcomson, 
(1989)). At the empirical level, researchers have attempted to assess the effectiveness of firing 
threats by studying employment protection legislation. For example, Ichino and Riphahn (2005) 
study absenteeism levels of the workers of an Italian bank before and after a probationary period. 
The authors report an increase in the level of absenteeism after the probationary period 
suggesting a negative incentive effect of employment protection. Similarly, Riphahn (2004) 
shows a negative relationship between employment protection and the level of absenteeism of 
German workers. Recently, Jacob (2013) reports a 10% decrease in absenteeism levels after 
principals were allowed more flexibility in firing teachers in the public schools system in 
Chicago. Interestingly, Jacob (2013) distinguishes incentive and selection effects of the newly 
implemented policy, and shows the prevalence of selection over incentive effects. These studies 
provide field evidence that restricting dismissal policies is likely to foster absenteeism which 
could in turn reduce workers’ performance. 
In this paper, we propose a different approach by assessing the impact of firing threats in a 
laboratory environment in which we directly assess the incentive effects of firing threats. In 
addition to obtaining direct measures of productivity and shirking behavior, the laboratory 
setting allows us to control for possible confounding factors such as firm size, industry structure, 
job characteristics, demand shocks, and organizational design. 
Our aim is to complement previous research by measuring directly workers’ effort, 
productivity and shirking behavior and assess the magnitude of incentive effects which were 
found to be modest in the field (Jacob, 2013). To that end, we study firing threats within a virtual 
workplace that reproduces features of existing organizations such as real effort tasks, real-time 
monitoring, on-the-job leisure (Internet browsing) and chatting (Corgnet, Hernan-Gonzalez and 
Rassenti (2013)).1 We study organizations in which bosses are endowed with a real-time 
monitoring technology so as to assess the work of their nine employees in each of the five 
                                            
1 This experimental platform was built in line with previous research introducing real-effort experiments in the study 
of labor issues (e.g. Dickinson (1999), Van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden (2001)). 
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periods of the experiment. In addition, we gave organizational members access to an electronic 
chat room to exchange messages during the experiment.   
We consider three types of incentive structures. In all cases subjects received the same fixed 
wage at the beginning of each period regardless of pending work productivity. Under the fixed 
wage treatment employees received no further incentives, while under firing threats they could 
be fired. Under individual incentives employees could not be fired and each employee was 
rewarded the entire income generated by his or her individual production on the work task. In the 
fixed wage and firing threats treatments the boss kept all the income generated by all members of 
the organization. Under firing threats, the boss was also given the option to dismiss one 
employee at the end of each of periods 2, 3, and 4.2 Bosses saved on labor costs after firing 
employees as they would not have to continue to pay their fixed wages. Subjects who made it to 
the start of the last period without being fired found themselves with de facto tenure for that final 
production period.  
Our analysis relates to the seminal work of Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) which studies a 
repeated principal-agent model à la Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) in which there is an 
excess supply of agents. In this setting, principals and agents can sign one-period contracts which 
specify a fixed payment from the principal to the agent and a desired but non-enforceable level 
of transfer from the agent to the principal. A crucial difference with the original setting of Fehr et 
al. (1993) is that the authors allow for reputational concerns and long-term contracts by keeping 
subjects’ identification numbers constant across periods. The authors find that principals and 
agents were willing to develop long-term relationships which in turn resulted in high levels of 
transfers. The findings in Brown et al. (2004) are in line with the disciplining version of the 
efficiency wage hypothesis according to which a combination of high wages and threat of 
dismissal leads to high levels of effort. 
In a recent experimental study, Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2011) extend the work of Brown 
et al. (2004) by introducing barriers to dismissals. The authors show that dismissal barriers tend 
to deter principals from building long-term relationships with agents. This is the case because 
agents’ transfers are significantly reduced when the threat of being dismissed by the principal is 
eliminated. Note that in Brown et al. (2004) and in Falk et al. (2011) dismissals occur either 
                                            
2 Workers could not be rehired by the boss in the rest of the experiment.  
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because the principal signs a one-period contract with another agent or because the agent quits. 
Even though this contractual design constitutes a privileged setting for studying relational 
contracts and dismissal barriers, it cannot isolate the effect of firing threats from the effect of 
quitting. In the present study, we abstract away from career concerns and labor markets and 
focus on the impact of firing threats on organizational behavior. 
Outside the laboratory, a number of studies using archival data have documented pervasive 
incentive effects by comparing work performance under hourly wages and piece rates (e.g. 
Lazear (2000), Shearer (2004)). Also, recent research using data from a large US firm during the 
2008 recession suggests that the intensification of firing threats during the economic downturn 
may explain the increase in productivity and work effort during the period (Lazear, Shaw and 
Stanton (2013)). In contrast to previous research, we study firing threats in a laboratory 
environment in which we can directly control for the intensity of firing threats as well as observe 
managers’ firing decisions. In our setting, we assess the effect of different incentive schemes on 
workers’ behavior inside firms. This includes the analysis of work effort, on-the-job leisure and 
workplace communication in addition to standard measures of work performance such as 
productivity. 
We found that organizations in which bosses were allowed to fire their employees produced 
twice as much as organizations which only relied on the payment of fixed wages. This was the 
case even though by the end of the experiment organizations which could fire employees were 
about 30% smaller than those that could not. Firing threats also decreased Internet usage and 
chatting activities by 77.7% in those periods in which the threat of being fired was present. 
Remarkably, firing threats reduced leisure activities and increased production levels for both 
low- and high- ability workers.  Nevertheless, the incentive effect of firing threats was not as 
compelling as those of individual incentives, as organizations endowed with individual 
incentives outperformed those endowed with firing threats by 43.3%. Also, the implementation 
of firing threats required significantly more monitoring effort (12.5% of managers’ time) than the 
implementation of individual incentives (only 2.5% of managers’ time) making it a less 
appealing option for managers. Interestingly, leisure activities were as low in the presence of 
firing threats as they were under individual incentives. As a result, the difference in workers’ 
production levels between the two treatments was due to a discrepancy in productivity levels 
rather than to a difference in working time. These findings suggest that in the presence of firing 
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threats, employees were willing to signal themselves as hard-working individuals who spend 
long hours at their workstation without browsing the Internet. Social psychologists refer to this 
process by which people attempt to influence others’ perceptions of themselves as impression 
management.3  
When firing threats disappear during the last production period of the firing threats treatment, 
workers’ production collapsed, and Internet usage surged, to levels which were similar to those 
of organizations which solely relied on the payment of fixed wages. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
2.1. Virtual Organizations 
We develop a framework in which subjects can undertake a real-effort organizational task 
while having access to Internet browsing and chatting activities at any point in time during the 
experiment. Each activity was undertaken in a separate window so that the experimenter had a 
precise measurement of the time spent on each activity. We consider organizations with ten 
subjects, nine of which were referred to as B subjects (employees) while the remaining subject 
was referred to as the C subject (boss). C subjects could monitor B subjects’ activities in real 
time. A session consisted of 5 periods of 20 minutes each.4 The experimental environment is 
described in detail below.5 
2.1.1. The Work Task 
We introduced a particularly long and laborious task so as to ensure that completing the work 
task required a significant level of effort. Subjects were asked to sum up matrices of 36 numbers 
for 1 hour and 40 minutes.6 As a result, we expected to identify signs of fatigue and boredom 
during the experiment. In the work task, subjects were not allowed to use a pen, scratch paper or 
calculator. This rule amplified the level of effort subjects had to exert in order to complete tables 
                                            
3 According to Newman (2009, p. 184), impression management is an “act presenting a favorable public image of 
oneself so that others will form positive judgments”. 
4 Due to a technical issue with the software, one of the sessions in Treatment W lasted only for 4 periods. This 
problem was solved for the other sessions. We control for this effect in the analysis of the results. 
5 See instructions at http://sites.google.com/site/vofiring/instructions. A video presentation of the software is 
available at http://sites.google.com/site/vofiring/videos. 
6 Different variations of this task have been used by Bartling, Fehr, Maréchal and Schunk (2009), Dohmen and Falk 
(2010), and Abeler, Falk, Goette and Huffman (2011). A counting task that consisted of summing up the number of 
zeros in a table randomly filled with ones and zeros was also used in Falk and Huffman (2007). A long typing task 
was used in Dickinson’s (1999) experiment for which subjects had to come during four days for a two-hour 
experiment. Falk and Ichino (2006) used a four-hour mailing task in their field experiment on peer effects. In 
another field experiment by Gneezy and List (2006), subjects were asked to enter data into a computer database for 
six hours. 
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correctly. Each table had 6 rows and 6 columns. The numbers in each table were generated 
randomly. 
Each table completed correctly generated a 40-cent profit while a penalty of 20 cents was 
subtracted from individual production for each incorrect answer.7 At the end of each period, and 
only then, the total amount of money generated by all 10 subjects during the period was 
displayed in the history panel located at the bottom of their screens.  
2.1.2. Internet Browsing 
The Internet browser was embedded in the software so that the experimenter could keep a 
record of the switching times between activities as well as the exact amount of time subjects 
spent on each activity. Subjects were informed that their usage of the Internet was strictly 
confidential.8 
The introduction of Internet is motivated by the widespread use of Internet at the workplace 
(Malachowski (2005)). An appealing feature of Internet as an alternative to the work task is the 
wide range of activities that can be completed online. Indeed, a large number of people are likely 
to derive utility from Internet access as they will be able to browse Web pages that best fit their 
personal interests.9  
2.1.3. Chatting Activities 
Subjects also had access to a chat room through which they could communicate with the other 
subjects during the experiment. A subject could send a message to all subjects at once or to any 
subset of them. If a subject received a message while not currently in the chat room, a pop-up 
window displaying the content of the message as well as the experiment ID of the sender would 
automatically appear on his or her screen. As a result, incoming chat could potentially distract 
subjects completing the work task. 
2.1.4. Monitoring Activities 
In all treatments, the C subject could monitor the nine B subjects’ activities at any time during 
the experiment. Monitoring activities had to be undertaken in a separate window so that the boss 
                                            
7 Penalties did not apply when individual production was equal to zero so that individual production could not be 
negative. 
8 Subjects were expected to follow the norms set by the university regarding the use of Internet on campus. 
9 Two related studies (Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009), Charness, Masclet and Villeval (2010)) have also 
introduced on-the-job leisure activities in experimental environments by giving subjects access to magazines. 
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could not complete his or her own work task, chat or browse the Internet while monitoring his or 
her employees. In the monitoring screen, the boss could decide whether to monitor all or a subset 
of the employees at the same time. The monitor received information in real time about the 
activities undertaken by the selected subject, their current total production, as well as their 
contribution to the work task (in % terms). Note that this technology assumes that bosses are able 
to monitor all the non-work activities of employees with great precision.10 One may argue that in 
a field setting, workers may be able to shirk without being observed by their monitor. However, 
current technology (e.g., SpectorSoft 360, Virtual Monitoring™, Employee Monitoring) allows 
for real-time monitoring that closely resembles our experimental design by allowing monitors to 
scrutinize employees activities and track the time spent on various applications. 
B subjects were notified with a message stating “The C subject is watching you” jointly with an 
eye picture whenever they were being watched. At the end of each period, the C subject had 
access to a monitoring summary, including information regarding B subjects’ production levels 
and contributions to total production. We acknowledge that in practice, workers may not 
necessarily be aware that they are being monitored. This lack of monitoring awareness could 
thus reduce the salience of firing threats potentially affecting their effectiveness.11  
In addition to the previously mentioned activities, each subject could click on a box moving 
slowly from left to right at the bottom of their screen. This aimed at representing the pay that 
workers obtain just for being present at their workstation regardless of their commitment to the 
work task. Each time subjects clicked on a box they earned 5 cents. The box appeared at the 
bottom of a subject’s screen every 25 seconds whether the subject was currently working on the 
work task, chatting, or browsing the Internet. Given that the experiment consisted of 5 periods of 
20 minutes each, subjects could earn a total of $12.00 just by clicking on all the 240 boxes that 
appeared on the screen during the experiment. 
  
                                            
10 Using cell phones or reading material unrelated to the experiment was not allowed in the lab so that on-the-job 
leisure activities were precisely measured by the experimenter. 
11 However, monitoring awareness is also likely to have a positive effect under fixed wages (Mas and Moretti, 2009) 
and low-powered incentives schemes (Corgnet et al. 2013). The fact that production levels were twice higher under 
firing threats than under fixed wages is thus unlikely to be accounted for by our methodological choice of making 
workers aware of monitoring. 
 
8 
2.2. Treatments 
We conducted three different treatments (see Table 1). In Treatments W (fixed wage) and F 
(firing threats), B subjects were rewarded a fixed payment of 200¢ each period while not 
receiving incentives based on their performance on the work task. The C subject received the 
output produced by all subjects (including him or herself) on the work task while not being paid 
any fixed wage. In Treatment F, the C subject could fire one B subject at the end of each of 
periods 2, 3 and 4. The C subject kept the fixed pay of dismissed B subjects in the following 
periods.  
TABLE 1. Summary of the treatments. 
Treatment Description 
Number of 
sessions 
(subjects) 
 
Fixed  
wage (W) 
 
B subjects were paid a fixed wage of 200¢ per period. The C 
subject kept the value of all output produced by all B subjects in the 
organization. In addition the C subject was paid the value of his/her 
own production.  The C subject could monitor B subjects’ activities 
but had no possible recourse. 
5 (50)12 
Firing  
threats (F) 
The C subject could monitor B subjects’ activities, and could fire 
one B subject at the end of periods 2, 3 and 4. Payment as in (W) 
but the C subject also kept the fixed pay of dismissed B subjects.   
6 (60) 
Individual 
incentives (I) 
B subjects were paid a fixed wage of 200¢ per period and were also 
rewarded the full value of their production. The C subject was paid 
only the value of his/her own production. The C subject could 
monitor B subjects’ activities but had no possible recourse.  
6 (60) 
   
Dismissed B subjects could only browse the Internet. They were rewarded solely for their 
earnings on the clicking task which were reduced to 1¢ per box instead of 5¢ per box for the 
active B and C subjects.13 They were not able to chat with active B and C subjects, and they 
could not be rehired. 
In Treatment I, B subjects received a fixed payment of 200¢ per period as in the previous 
treatments, in addition to being rewarded on the work task according to their individual 
production. In this treatment, C subjects were paid only the value of their own production (they 
did not collect the value of the output produced by B subjects). Treatment I is designed to lead to 
                                            
12 One session was cancelled because of insufficient subjects.  
13 As a result, the maximum period earnings of dismissed subjects on the clicking task were equal to 48¢ instead of 
240¢ for active B and C subjects. 
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the maximum level of production by paying B subjects the full product of their effort, that is a 
payment of 40ȼ per correct table. Under individual incentives, no residual output can be 
allocated to C subjects because B subjects are already paid the full product of their effort.14 We 
use Treatment I as a benchmark to assess the incentive effects of firing threats.15 
In all treatments, subjects received their individual earnings on the clicking task. 
2.3. Procedures 
Our subject pool consisted of students from a major US University. The experiments took 
place in May 2011. In total, 170 subjects participated in the experiment, divided into 17 sessions. 
We conducted five sessions for Treatment W, and six sessions for each of Treatments F and I. 
Ten students participated in each session. All of the interaction was anonymous. Subjects had 20 
minutes to read the instructions on their screens. Three minutes before the end of the instructions 
period, a monitor announced the time remaining and handed out a printed copy of the summary 
of the instructions. None of the subjects asked for extra time to read the instructions. The 
interaction between the experimenter and the subjects was negligible. 
At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their earnings in cash, rounded up to the 
nearest quarter. Individual earnings at the end of the experiment were computed as the sum of all 
earnings in the 5 periods. Participants playing the role of a B (C) subject in Treatments W, F, and 
I, earned on average $28.00 ($55.25), $27.74 ($85.20), and $38.95 ($37.91), respectively. This 
includes a $7.00 show-up fee. Experimental sessions lasted on average two hours and thirty 
minutes.  
3. HYPOTHESES: FIRING THREATS AND IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT 
In order to establish predictions regarding production levels and Internet usage across 
treatments, we rely on standard incentive theory (see Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review).  
                                            
14 Alternatively, we could have artificially doubled the value of the output generated by B subjects in Treatment I 
and pay 40ȼ to C subjects for each correct table completed by a B subject as is the case in Treatments W and F. 
However, this alternative design would have made it difficult to compare production levels in Treatment I (where 
stakes would have been doubled) with production levels in Treatments W and F. 
15 We did not consider the treatment combing individual incentives and firing threats as our main purpose was to 
study the incentive effects of firing threats in comparison to weak (fixed wages) and strong (individual incentives) 
incentives schemes. In the theoretical literature, firing threats and individual incentives are studied in isolation since 
the latter is already supposed to lead to an efficient level of effort. Thus, firing threats are seen as a substitute for 
individual incentives rather than as a complement. Nevertheless, an interesting avenue for future research would be 
to study the conditions under which firing threats and individual incentives could complement each other in practice. 
This study would require conducting an experiment where both, firing threats and individual incentives, are present. 
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We build on a two-period model of an organization composed of multiple workers and a 
supervisor.16 In the firing treatment, the first period corresponds to a probationary period at the 
end of which the supervisor can fire workers. 
In our model, workers can dedicate their time to either work or leisure activities. Workers may 
possess different levels of ability on the work task. Regardless of their ability level, workers vary 
in their level of intrinsic motivation to complete the task (Deci (1971, 1975) and Deci, Koestner 
and Ryan (1999)). Workers’ levels of ability and intrinsic motivation are assumed to be private 
information. Note that instead of intrinsic motivation we could have invoked altruism 
(Rotemberg, 1994) and other social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) to justify that workers 
may exert effort in the absence of monetary incentives. However, in the presence of firing threats 
workers may downplay distributive concerns and increase production to avoid dismissal.17  
In addition to working on the task and undertaking leisure activities, workers can be present at 
their workstation without generating production. This may give their supervisor the impression 
that they prefer the work task to Internet browsing. In the field, these nonproductive activities 
may include shirking activities which are not perfectly monitored by managers such as using cell 
phones for personal purposes or reading offline material unrelated to work.  In that case, the 
worker may either decide to complete the task with minimal effort (e.g. providing random 
answers) or choose not to complete the task at all. We refer to this behavior as impression 
management. The supervisor can monitor workers and obtain information regarding their 
production levels and the time they spend at their workstation. However, the supervisor cannot 
distinguish between productive and nonproductive work activities. 
In this section, we present the hypotheses derived from our theoretical model. The formal 
version of the model is presented in Appendix B and proofs are available in Appendix 1 online.  
  
                                            
16 This model does not include multiple probationary periods as is the case in our experimental design. The essence 
of our results would not be affected by considering such case.   
17 Distributive concerns may also be dampened in our model because payoff asymmetry across roles does not 
depend on one person’s decision but on the production of the ten members of the organization. This makes it 
difficult for subjects to coordinate on an individual level of production that would limit payoff asymmetry. We may 
also conjecture that aversion to inequality is reduced in a context in which nine of the ten participants in the 
experiment still earn the exact same amount regardless of subjects’ individual production. 
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Hypothesis 1 (Production levels and Internet usage) 
i) We expect workers’ production levels to be greater in the treatments with either individual 
incentives (I) or firing threats (F) than in the fixed wage treatment (W). Also, we expect workers’ 
Internet usage to be lower in Treatments I and F than in Treatment W. 
ii) Workers’ production levels as well as Internet usage can be either greater or lower in the 
individual incentives treatment than in the treatment with firing threats.  
A necessary condition for the treatment with firing threats to lead to greater production levels 
and lower Internet usage than individual incentives is for intrinsic motivation to be sufficiently 
large. The treatment with individual incentives is expected to lead to greater production levels 
and lower Internet usage than the treatment with firing threats for low to moderate levels of 
intrinsic motivation. 
By distinguishing between productive and non-productive effort, our theoretical framework 
allows for impression management to arise in equilibrium. For example, consider the case of 
high-ability non-intrinsically motivated workers who decide to mimic the work behavior of low-
ability intrinsically motivated workers in order to reduce their likelihood of being fired (see 
equilibria of types i and iii in Table O.1 in Appendix 1 online). High-ability workers will be able 
to achieve the output of low-ability workers in a fraction of the time necessary for low-ability 
workers to do so. In the remaining time, high-ability workers will stay at their workstation 
exerting non-productive effort in order to mimic the work behavior of low-ability workers. A 
consequence of impression management is that individual productivity measured as individual 
production per unit of working time is expected to be lower in the firing treatment compared 
with Treatments W and I. We state this conjecture as follows.  
Hypothesis 2 (Impression management) 
We expect to observe impression management in the treatment with firing threats. As a result, we 
expect productivity levels to be lower with firing threats than in the other two treatments. 
Regarding firing decisions, our theoretical framework predicts that supervisors will dismiss 
workers with the lowest performance levels since they signal low ability as well as a lack of 
intrinsic motivation. 
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Hypothesis 3 (Firing decisions) 
We expect supervisors to fire the workers with the lowest levels of performance in the 
organization. 
Following our theoretical framework, we also expect supervisors to shy away from monitoring 
activities in the treatments without firing threats (Treatments W and I) preferring either to work 
for cash or to browse the Internet. By contrast, in the firing treatment (F), monitoring workers’ 
production and effort levels is valuable to supervisors as it increases the probability of not 
dismissing intrinsically motivated workers who will continue to work even after firing threats are 
removed. We summarize this conjecture as follows. 
Hypothesis 4 (Monitoring) 
We expect the time spent by the supervisor monitoring workers to be greater in the treatment 
with firing threats than in the other two treatments.  
An important implication of our theoretical framework is that the effect of firing threats is 
expected to be observed for both low- and high- ability workers. 
Hypothesis 5 (Firing threats and workers’ ability) 
We expect the positive effect of firing threats on workers’ production levels and its negative 
effect on Internet usage to be observed across ability levels. 
In the last period of Treatment F, firing threats are removed so that workers’ levels of 
production and Internet usage are expected to converge to the levels which are observed in 
Treatment W. 
Hypothesis 6 (Removal of firing threats) 
i) In the last period of the experiment, we expect the production levels of workers not to be 
significantly different between the fixed wage treatment with firing threats (F) and the fixed wage 
treatment (W). We expect the production levels of workers to be greater in the treatment with 
individual incentives (I) than in the other two treatments.    
ii) In the last period of the experiment, we expect Internet usage not to be significantly different 
between the fixed wage treatment with firing threats (F) and the fixed wage treatment (W). We 
expect Internet usage of workers to be lower in the treatment with individual incentives (I) than 
in the other two treatments.   
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iii) In the last period of the experiment, we expect the time spent by the supervisor monitoring 
workers to be the same across all treatments. 
4. RESULTS 
In Sections 4.1 to 4.5, we analyze the first four periods of our experiment which correspond to 
probationary periods in Treatment F. In Section 4.6, we present the results of the last period 
when the threat of being fired is removed. In the appendix, we also report our findings when 
pooling the data for the five periods of the experiment. However, the interpretation of these 
results should be taken with care as it includes, in Treatment F, periods in which firing threats 
apply and the last period in which firing threats are removed.   
4.1. Production and Internet Usage 
We define total production on the work task as the total monetary amount generated by a 
subject’s answers on the task divided by the reward for each correct answer (40¢). If not 
specified otherwise, we refer to the production and Internet usage of workers who are currently 
part of the organization. This implies that in Treatment F, we exclude the subjects who have been 
fired before the current period. In Section 4.3, we extend our analysis to include fired workers 
when discussing selection effects. 
 
FIGURE 1.— Period-evolution of B subjects’ average production (left panel) 
and Internet usage (right panel) across treatments18 
Figure 1 shows average production (left panel) and Internet usage (right panel) for the first four 
periods of our three treatments. 
                                            
18 Subjects who had been fired before the current period are excluded. 
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In order to assess any statistical differences in individual production across treatments, we use 
a series of tests that account for the specific nature of our data. More specifically, we use 
modifications of standard t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to the case of clustered data. We 
control for clusters at the organization level to take into account a possible correlation in the 
performance of members of the same organization (see Tables A.4 to A.6).19 Note that our 
results continue to hold using standard non-clustered version of the tests. 
Production levels for B subjects in the first four periods were significantly higher under 
individual incentives (18.3) than under firing threats (12.8) or fixed wages (6.6) (see Tables A.1 
and A.4 in the appendix for a detailed statistical analysis).20 The fact that individual incentives 
outperform firing threats is consistent with Hypothesis 1 for low to moderate levels of intrinsic 
motivation which is likely to be the case for the dull and repetitive task used in our study. It is 
interesting to note that in the fixed wage treatment, not only was average individual production 
strictly greater than zero but the great majority of subjects (82.0%) completed at least one correct 
table per period. This is consistent with the assumption that workers may be intrinsically 
motivated to complete the task in the absence of incentives as we account for in our theoretical 
framework.21 
In addition, B subjects were browsing the Internet significantly more in the fixed wage 
treatment (31.8% of their time) compared with the firing treatment (8.0%) or the individual 
incentives treatment (8.3%) (see Tables A.2 and A.5 in the appendix).22 We identify no 
significant differences in Internet usage between Treatments I and F. 
                                            
19 The p-values of the clustered t-tests can also be obtained by running linear panel regressions with clustered 
standard errors and a treatment dummy to assess differences in the dependent variable across treatments. The 
clustered version of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test was performed using Datta and Satten test (2005). Datta and Satten 
(2005) as well as Galbraith, Daniel and Vissel (2010) provided us with R codes for the test. The codes for the 
clustered t-test in R were provided by Frank Harrell who implemented the procedure used in Donner, Birkett and 
Buck (1981). 
20 We do not present treatment comparisons for the case of C subjects in the main text because of their limited 
number per treatment. These results are shown in the appendix. 
21 In an independent survey, we report evidence of the importance of intrinsic motivation in the performance of 
subjects in our experimental environment. In particular, we show that the answer to the question “How much do you 
like mathematics?” was significantly correlated with subjects’ performance on the work task even after controlling 
for subjects’ ability levels (see Appendix 2 online for more details).  
22 Circumstantially, the proportion of their time subjects dedicated to Internet usage under fixed wages (31.8%) was 
similar to the figures published in the 2005 study by American Online and Salary.com according to which 
employees spend about 26.1% of their time on activities unrelated to their work (Malachowski (2005)). Our results 
show that, even in a laboratory environment usually prone to generating demand effects, subjects were ready to 
undertake leisure activities for which they were not paid by the experimenter. 
 
15 
Our findings support Hypothesis 1 according to which firing threats tend to raise production 
levels and reduce Internet usage compared with the fixed wage treatment. 
Despite significant differences in production levels between the firing and the individual 
incentives treatments, Internet usage was remarkably similar (see Table A.5 in the appendix). As 
a result, subjects spent as much time on the work task screen in the firing treatment (88.3%) as 
subjects did in the individual incentives treatment (90.0%) while producing significantly less 
(see Figure 1). In the fixed wage treatment, B subjects spent only 47.5% of their time on average 
on the work task screen (see Tables A.3 and A.6 for a detailed statistical analysis of working 
time differences across treatments and periods). 
In other words, not only did subjects produce less in the firing treatment compared with the 
individual incentives treatment, but they also engaged in significantly more impression 
management. We assess productivity by computing average individual production for ten 
minutes of working time. Subjects of type B produced on average 1.8, 1.9 and 2.6 tables for ten 
minutes of working time in the fixed wage, firing and individual incentives treatments, 
respectively. It is important to note that working time in Treatment W was twice as low as in 
Treatments F and I implying that productivity in Treatment W could not be directly compared 
with the other two treatments. This is the case because learning effects on the work task are 
significant as is illustrated by the positive trend in production in both Treatments F and I (see 
Figure 1).23 Thus, in order to test Hypothesis 2 we use a regression analysis in which we compare 
productivity levels across treatments while controlling for working time. In line with Hypothesis 
2, we find that productivity levels in Treatment F were significantly lower than in the other two 
treatments (see Table A.7 in the appendix). 
In addition to Internet browsing, chatting activities could divert subjects’ attention from the 
work task. Chatting had no strategic function in this experiment except for the firing treatment in 
which case C subjects could use the chat room to define their firing policy and threaten B 
subjects. The categorization of chat messages support the fact that the chat room was largely 
used as a distraction device (see Appendix 4 online). Interestingly, we observe that, in the 
treatment with firing threats, B subjects excluded the C subject from their messages in the 
                                            
23 Using a Tobit regression with random effects with individual production as dependent variable and a constant and 
a trend as regressors, we find that the p-value associated with the trend coefficient was lower than 0.0001 for 
Treatments F and Treatment I. See also a related study by Corgnet et al. (2013) for evidence of learning effects on a 
similar task. 
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majority of cases (54.8%). By contrast, this happened in only a small proportion of the cases in 
Treatments W (6.9%) and I (9.3%).24 In the firing treatment, B subjects may have excluded the C 
subject from their chat discussions so as to avoid being caught by their boss chatting instead of 
working.25 This suggests that firing threats led subjects to feel concerned not only about their 
production levels but also about their dedication to the work task. Employees were then inclined 
to influence positively the perception of their boss regarding their work dedication. This behavior 
can be classified as impression management (see Newman (2009)). These results relate to the 
field study of Jacob (2013) that reports a decrease in teachers’ absenteeism after firing 
restrictions had been removed.26  
Finally, subjects could also obtain earnings from clicking on boxes appearing at the bottom of 
their screen. No significant differences were observed across treatments regarding the clicking 
task. Subjects successfully clicked on the box in 94%, 96% and 95% of its appearances in 
Treatments W, F and I, respectively (see Appendix 3 online). 
4.2. Firing Decisions 
We turn to the analysis of firing decisions of the C subjects in Treatment F. We observe that 
the B subjects who were fired in a given period were producing on average significantly less than 
the other B subjects in the organization (see Table 2). In line with Hypothesis 3, all the subjects 
who were fired in periods 2, 3 or 4 were the lowest producers in their respective sessions. In the 
cases in which several subjects produced the lowest amount on the work task (this occurred in 
four occasions), the subject who was finally fired was the one who was caught browsing the 
Internet more often during the period. 
Also, there is anecdotal evidence that chat conversations may have affected the C subject’s 
firing decisions. This was apparent in the first firing decision in Session 1 in which case two 
subjects produced the same low amount on the task and were both caught on the Internet.  
Subject B19 was fired after expressing the following opinions publicly in the chat room: “if C 
                                            
24 We confirm the significance of these findings with a proportion test comparing Treatment F with Treatments W 
and I (p-value < 0.001). The p-value for the comparison between Treatments W and I is equal to 0.150. 
25 The messages excluding the C subjects were mostly general and non-strategic messages (66.5%, 70.0% and 
76.5% of messages in Treatments W, F and I). 
26 In the presence of firing threats, teachers may decide to limit evident shirking behaviors by attending school more 
often while not increasing their work effort. This interpretation seems to be consistent with the fact that the decrease 
in absenteeism was most pronounced for teachers whose shirking behavior was most noticeable (more than fifteen 
annual absences). Also, Jacob (2013) reports modest incentive effects which may be due to teachers attempting to 
impress principals while being reluctant to work harder. 
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keeps being a rude passive aggressive boss; we can go on strike. If C fires all of us; C makes no 
income either”. 
TABLE 2. Summary of firing decisions per period. 
 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Total 
Total [maximum possible] 
number of fired subjects 
5 [6] 5 [6] 4 [6] 14 [18] 
Average production of 
subjects before being fired27 
0.1 0.9 1.5 6.0 
Average production 
of other B subjects 
3.2 3.3 3.5 19.8 
P-value28 0.1972 [0.031] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
     
4.3. Selection Effects 
The selection effect of firing threats follows from the previous finding that worst performers 
are fired first. This implies that the organizations which are endowed with firing threats retain 
better workers on average than the organizations assigned to the other two treatments. However, 
the difference in production levels across treatments does not seem to be solely accounted for by 
a selection effect. For example, average production was still higher in Treatment F than in 
Treatment W even after taking into account dismissed workers, who produced nothing in periods 
3 and 4 (see row “including fired subjects” in Tables A.1 and A.4). 
Additionally, we propose a technique to isolate the selection effect present in Treatment F. To 
do so, we simulate which workers would have been fired in Treatments W and I had the 
managers been allowed to dismiss subjects. This amounts to excluding from the analysis the 
worst performer in period 2 and in period 3 for the remaining periods. Using this procedure, we 
can compare average production across treatments for organizations which have the same 
number of producers in all periods.29 We continue to report a significantly higher average 
production (all p-values < 0.002), and lower levels of Internet usage (all p-values < 0.005), in the 
                                            
27 By multiplying these numbers by 40¢ one obtains the average monetary contribution of those subjects. It is 
evident that the average monetary contribution is well below the fixed wage of 200¢ received by B subjects at the 
beginning of each period. 
28 This p-value refers to the clustered t-test [Wilcoxon rank-sum test] that assesses whether average production is the 
same for subjects who were fired and for those who were not fired. 
29 That is, the 9 B subjects in periods 1 and 2, the 8 best performers in period 3, and the 7 best performers in period 
4. Given that no workers were fired in one session of Treatment F, we ran 5 (6) different simulations by selecting 
one session in which we did not exclude any workers in Treatment W (I). P-values do not differ substantially across 
simulations. 
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firing treatment compared to the fixed wage treatment. We also find a significantly greater 
average production in the first four periods in the individual incentives treatment than in the 
firing treatment (all p-values < 0.087), whereas Internet usage was not significantly different (all 
p-values > 0.784). In sum, treatment differences in production levels and Internet usage cannot 
be solely accounted for by selection effects. 
4.4. Monitoring 
The fact that C subjects fired B subjects according to their relative performance levels suggests 
that C subjects were monitoring B subjects to gather information about their production and work 
dedication. Following Hypothesis 4 we expect C subjects to monitor B subjects more intensively 
in Treatment F than in Treatments W and I (see Table 3).  We confirm this conjecture in a Tobit 
regression with a treatment dummy for firing threats (p-value = 0.031, See Table A.8 in the 
appendix).30 
TABLE 3. Period evolution of monitoring activities (% of total time). 
Treatment 
Proportion of total time 
(in %) C subjects spent 
monitoring 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Fixed wage (W) 5.3% 7.6% 7.0% 2.6% 4.1% 
Firing threats (F) 12.2% 12.1% 18.2% 8.7% 9.8% 
Individual incentives (I) 2.5% 0.8% 3.4% 4.3% 1.7% 
4.5. The Effect of Firing Threats Across Ability Levels 
We investigate Hypothesis 5 by analyzing the effect of firing threats on subjects’ production 
across ability levels. To do so, we classify B subjects as either high- or low- ability workers 
depending on whether they completed their first table correctly (we obtain similar results by 
categorizing subjects according to their performance rank in the first period of the experiment). 
In an independent study, first table performance was shown to be significantly correlated to 
subjects’ summation skills as measured using an incentivized summation task in the spirit of 
Dohmen and Falk (2011) (see Table O.4, column 2 in Appendix 2 online). We also rely on 
previous research showing the positive relationship between first table performance and 
                                            
30 When compared separately using Tobit regressions with treatment dummies, the average time spent by C subjects 
monitoring was significantly greater in the firing treatment than in the individual incentives treatment (p-
value=0.040). However, we did not find significant differences between the fixed wage treatment and the treatment 
with individual incentives (p-value=0.233) or between the fixed wage treatment and the firing treatment (p-
value=0.201). 
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subsequent production (see Corgnet et al., 2013 and Appendix 2 online). We classify 65% of the 
B subjects as high-ability workers. This proportion is equal to 58%, 59% and 73% for 
Treatments W, F and I, respectively. We recognize that this ability measure may have been 
influenced by treatment effects. We do not find, however, significant differences in the 
proportion of high-ability B subjects across treatments (the p-values for the proportion tests 
comparing Treatments W and F, W and I, and F and I, are equal to 0.7604, 0.3912, and 0.189, 
respectively). 
Both low- and high- ability B subjects produced more in the treatment with firing threats (8.3 
and 16.3) than in the fixed wage treatment (3.3 and 8.3) (see Table A.9 in the appendix for 
statistical analysis). In addition, Internet usage was reduced by 81.0% and 68.0% in Treatment F 
with respect to Treatment W for low- and high- ability subjects, respectively. In sum, in line with 
Hypothesis 5, the positive effect of firing threats on individual production and its negative impact 
on Internet usage held across ability levels. 
4.6. Removal of Firing Threats 
In the treatment with firing threats, average production decreased from 4.7 in the fourth period 
to 3.5 in the last period reaching a level closer to the fixed wage treatment (2.1). Average 
production in the last period was significantly larger in the individual incentives treatment (6.1) 
than in the firing treatment. We report no significant differences in last-period average 
production between the fixed wage treatment and the treatment with firing threats (see Table A.4 
in the appendix). As a result, removing firing threats in Treatment F led to a collapse in B 
subjects’ production levels. This result is in line with Hypothesis 6i as well as with the 
experimental findings in Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2011). 
In addition, Internet usage increased sharply from an average of 8.0% in the first four periods 
to 20.9% of total available time in the last period in the firing treatment (p-value < 0.001).31 
Internet usage did not increase significantly in the other two treatments. Similarly, work 
dedication decreased from an average of 88.3% in the first four periods to 62.0% of total 
available time in the last period in the firing treatment (p-value < 0.001) (see Figure 2). In the 
                                            
31 The reported p-value corresponds to the dummy regressor that takes value one for the last period and value zero 
for the previous periods in a Tobit panel regression with random effects. The dependent variable is the time spent on 
Internet by a given subject in a given period and the independent variables are the constant term and the last period 
dummy. Only the B subjects who had not been fired were included in the regression. For Treatments W and I, the p-
values of the last period dummy were equal to 0.900 and 0.144, respectively. A similar conclusion can be obtained 
by using dummies for each period (see Table A.10 in the appendix).  
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last period, work dedication was significantly lower in the firing treatment (62.0%) and in the 
fixed wage treatment (41.7%) than in the treatment with individual incentives (88.5%) (see Table 
A.6 in the appendix). Our findings are consistent with Hypothesis 6ii. 
 
FIGURE 2.— Evolution of the average time (in %) that B subjects, who had not 
(yet) been fired, spent working. 
Finally, monitoring time decreased sharply in the firing treatment from an average of 12.2% in 
the first four periods to 5.2% in the last period. In line with Hypothesis 6iii, we find no 
significant differences in monitoring time between the treatment with firing threats and the other 
two treatments in the last period (see Table A.8 in the appendix).  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we investigated the impact of firing threats in a virtual organization characterized 
by real-effort tasks, access to leisure activities and real-time supervision. We showed that the 
introduction of firing threats significantly affected organizational behavior. In particular, 
production was more than twice as high in the presence of firing threats as in their absence while 
on-the-job leisure activities (Internet browsing and chatting) were almost eradicated. These 
results show that even though firing threats were limited to a maximum of one-third of the labor 
force (three out of nine workers), they positively affected the work effort of all employees. 
Nevertheless, organizations endowed with firing threats produced significantly less than 
organizations in which individual incentives were used. Interestingly, organizations endowed 
with firing threats did not differ from those using individual incentives in terms of leisure 
activities. These results suggest that employees facing firing threats were willing to appear to 
their bosses as hard-working individuals spending most of their time on the work task. According 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
Individual incentives Fixed Wages Firing
 
21 
to our theoretical framework, a consequence of such signaling behaviors is the reduced 
productivity of workers in the firing treatment compared with the fixed wage and individual 
incentives treatments. We were able to confirm this conjecture. The time spent on the work task 
was the same under firing threats and individual incentives while production levels were about 
25% lower under firing threats compared to individual incentives. These findings suggest that 
under firing threats, employees were willing to signal themselves as hard-working individuals 
who spend long hours at their workstation without browsing the Internet. This implies that firing 
threats are likely to promote impression management activities. As a result, employers may fail 
to dismiss unmotivated workers leading to a collapse in firm performance when firing threats are 
removed. This result suggests that previous research reporting a decrease in absenteeism levels 
after the removal of employment protection (e.g. Riphahn 2004, Jacob, 2013) may be partly 
explained by the fact that workers try to impress their supervisors by showing up for work more 
often while not being more productive at work. 
Our study uncovers the magnitude of incentive effects of firing threats, complementing earlier 
field research on employment protection. Previous field research mostly focused on indirect 
measures of performance such as absenteeism and reported only modest incentive effects. 
In this paper, we focused on the incentives effects of firing threats after controlling for 
screening effects. Nonetheless, the screening effect of firing threats may be substantial as low 
performers may be reluctant to accept jobs which involve high risks of termination (Jacob, 
2013). An interesting avenue for future research would be to study the magnitude of screening 
effects in a similar controlled environment. 
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7. APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND REGRESSION ANALYSES 
TABLE A.1 Average (median) [standard deviation] individual production across treatments. 
Treatment Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Subtotal 
Periods 1 to 4 
Period 5 TOTAL 
B 
Subjects 
only 
Fixed Wage 1.54 
(1.00) 
[1.75] 
1.41 
(1.00) 
[1.61] 
1.77 
(1.00) 
[2.39] 
1.84 
(1.00) 
[2.45] 
6.57 
(4.00) 
[6.52] 
2.07 
(0.75) 
[3.09] 
8.56 
(6.00) 
[8.71] 
Individual Incentives 3.04 
(2.50) 
[2.76] 
4.45 
(4.00) 
[3.92] 
5.14 
(5.50) 
[3.87] 
5.68 
(5.00) 
[3.96] 
18.31 
(15.25) 
[13.21] 
6.10 
(6.00) 
[4.21] 
24.41 
(21.25) 
[16.93] 
Firing Threats        
All 10 subjects 
(including fired subjects) 
2.52 
(2.25) 
[2.56] 
3.28 
(2.50) 
[3.18] 
3.17 
(2.75) 
[2.72] 
3.81 
(3.50) 
[3.97] 
12.78 
(12.25) 
[11.52] 
2.58 
(1.00) 
[3.58] 
15.36 
(14.25) 
[14.38] 
Excluding fired 
subjects# - - 
3.49 
(3.50) 
[2.64] 
4.68 
(4.00) 
[3.91] 
12.87 
(12.58) 
[11.48] 
3.49 
(2.25) 
[3.76] 
15.65 
(15.25) 
[14.27] 
C 
Subjects 
only 
Fixed Wage 2.00 
(2.00) 
[1.58] 
2.80 
(1.50) 
[2.75] 
3.30 
(3.00) 
[2.54] 
5.60 
(5.00) 
[3.58] 
13.70 
(9.50) 
[9.78] 
6.88 
(7.25) 
[3.75] 
19.20 
(16.00) 
[14.02] 
Individual Incentives 3.67 
(3.00) 
[4.19] 
4.50 
(4.00) 
[4.60] 
5.67 
(3.50) 
[6.27] 
6.00 
(5.25) 
[5.19] 
19.833 
(15.00) 
[19.34] 
7.17 
(5.50) 
[6.68] 
27.00 
(20.50) 
[25.80] 
Firing Threats 2.08 
(2.50) 
[1.32] 
2.83 
(2.00) 
[3.27] 
4.50 
(3.50) 
[3.62] 
3.83 
(3.50) 
[3.24] 
13.25 
(9.75) 
[9.89] 
3.33 
(3.00) 
[1.86] 
16.58 
(12.75) 
[11.67] 
#In this case, total (subtotal) production was computed as the total production in periods 1 to 5 (1 to 4) divided by the number of periods each worker was part 
of the company and multiplied by 5 (4). Note that this procedure is equivalent to calculating the sum of workers’ production across periods for the other 
treatments. We used the same procedure to calculate total production in Treatment W, given that in one session subjects could participate in the first four 
periods only, due to an error in the software. 
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TABLE A.2 Average (median) [standard deviation] percentage of time subjects spent on Internet across treatments. 
Treatment Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Subtotal 
Periods 1 to 4 
Period 5 TOTAL 
B 
Subjects 
only 
Fixed Wage 23.14 
(7.93) 
[29.52] 
34.45 
(24.90) 
[32.73] 
34.72 
(20.99) 
[32.54] 
36.04 
(28.58) 
[32.57] 
31.80 
(29.57) 
[24.67] 
33.69 
(29.59) 
[31.35] 
31.06 
(29.96) 
[22.78] 
Individual Incentives 7.40 
(2.30) 
[12.31] 
8.91 
(1.70) 
[17.90] 
9.73 
(1.48) 
[19.91] 
7.16 
(0.94) 
[17.42] 
8.30 
(2.45) 
[14.70] 
10.21 
(1.32) 
[21.32] 
8.68 
(2.78) 
[14.99] 
Firing Threats        
All 10 subjects 
(including fired subjects) 
8.55 
(2.58) 
[15.63] 
5.49 
(2.01) 
[10.75] 
16.54 
(2.01) 
[31.51] 
26.19 
(1.87) 
[38.53] 
14.19 
(2.57) 
[19.54] 
41.40 
(18.46) 
[43.38] 
19.63 
(8.46) 
[22.22] 
Excluding fired 
subjects - - 
8.02 
(1.90) 
[17.22] 
9.42 
(1.44) 
[16.58] 
7.97 
(2.28) 
[13.19] 
20.89 
(2.90) 
[29.88] 
9.93 
(3.05) 
[14.06] 
C 
Subjects 
only 
Fixed Wage 4.17 
(4.65) 
[1.81] 
5.53 
(1.52) 
[7.49] 
4.71 
(3.03) 
[4.78] 
5.57 
(3.06) 
[5.73] 
4.70 
(4.30) 
[3.70] 
6.76 
(2.14) 
[10.11] 
4.89 
(4.93) 
[3.29] 
Individual Incentives 1.66 
(1.79) 
[0.49] 
3.40 
(1.61) 
[3.78] 
3.50 
(1.48) 
[4.99] 
3.09 
(1.76) 
[3.53] 
2.91 
(1.87) 
[1.86] 
3.80 
(1.58) 
[6.12] 
3.09 
(1.78) 
[2.46] 
Firing Threats 2.40 
(2.20) 
[0.72] 
2.42 
(2.50) 
[0.84] 
5.00 
(2.28) 
[5.69] 
1.32 
(1.19) 
[0.61] 
2.78 
(2.14) 
[1.64] 
2.14 
(1.36) 
[1.82] 
2.66 
(2.16) 
[1.61] 
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TABLE A.3 Average (median) [standard deviation] percentage of time subjects spent working across treatments. 
Treatment Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Subtotal 
Periods 1 to 4 
Period 5 TOTAL 
B 
Subjects 
only 
Fixed Wage 59.61 
(65.99) 
[29.96] 
46.69 
(43.29) 
[33.56] 
42.51 
(45.48) 
[35.06] 
41.19 
(39.63) 
[35.16] 
47.49 
(50.41) 
[27.60] 
41.69 
(33.86) 
[40.02] 
44.94 
(43.51) 
[27.56] 
Individual Incentives 90.93 
(97.27) 
[13.42] 
89.51 
(98.04) 
[18.46] 
88.37 
(97.77) 
[20.50] 
91.21 
(98.37) 
[17.62] 
90.00 
(96.66) 
[15.29] 
88.53 
(98.05) 
[21.60] 
89.71 
(96.22) 
[15.47] 
Firing Threats        
All 10 subjects 
(including fired subjects) 
87.87 
(95.69) 
[18.25] 
89.90 
(96.19) 
[14.49] 
80.37 
(96.73) 
[32.98] 
70.86 
(91.85) 
[38.94] 
82.25 
(93.73) 
[21.38] 
45.91 
(39.32) 
[42.79] 
74.98 
(81.51) 
[23.38] 
Excluding fired 
subjects - - 
88.57 
(97.13) 
[21.44] 
86.96 
(98.33) 
[20.88] 
88.30 
(95.82) 
[16.61] 
61.98 
(73.60) 
[38.30] 
83.46 
(90.02) 
[18.97] 
C 
Subjects 
only 
Fixed Wage 76.68 
(85.30) 
[23.89] 
74.06 
(84.13) 
[21.71] 
72.54 
(89.50) 
[28.05] 
76.33 
(82.73) 
[22.90] 
75.39 
(89.33) 
[20.97] 
87.88 
(87.99) 
[12.27] 
74.96 
(86.82) 
[20.65] 
Individual Incentives 97.39 
(98.02) 
[1.73] 
92.68 
(97.59) 
[8.30] 
91.38 
(95.99) 
[13.68] 
95.07 
(96.29) 
[4.69] 
94.13 
(97.00) 
[5.23] 
89.59 
(93.89) 
[11.58] 
93.22 
(96.97) 
[6.22] 
Firing Threats 81.62 
(83.54) 
[16.30] 
69.59 
(71.41) 
[25.99] 
82.01 
(80.04) 
[9.60] 
82.50 
(85.81) 
[16.74] 
78.93 
(78.56) 
[12.64] 
89.87 
(93.19) 
[10.40] 
81.12 
(81.79) 
[11.34] 
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TABLE A.4 P-values for clustered t-tests (clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) 
assessing differences in period production across treatments. 
 Treatment Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Subtotal Periods 1 to 4 Period 5 TOTAL 
B 
Subjects 
only 
Fixed Wage vs. 
Individual Incentives 
0.012 
(0.042) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
 Fixed Wage vs. 
Firing Threats 
       
 All 10 subjects 
(including fired subjects) 
0.033 
(0.066) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
0.038 
(0.044) 
0.004 
(0.032) 
0.002 
(0.037) 
0.587 
(0.744) 
0.005 
(0.041) 
 Excluding fired 
subjects 
- - 0.017 
(0.027) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.035) 
0.135 
(0.165) 
0.006 
0.039 
 Individual Incentives 
vs. Firing Threats 
       
 All 10 subjects 
(including fired subjects) 
0.335 
(0.360) 
0.118 
(0.133) 
0.018 
(0.054) 
0.040 
(0.032) 
0.051 
(0.054) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.020) 
 Excluding fired 
subjects 
- - 0.015 
(0.058) 
0.106 
(0.077) 
0.055 
(0.061) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.025) 
C 
Subjects 
only 
Fixed Wage vs. 
Individual Incentives 
0.928 
(0.999) 
0.986 
(0.782) 
0.536 
(0.926) 
0.418 
(0.464) 
0.517 
(0.931) 
0.155 
(0.133) 
0.748 
(0.855) 
 Fixed Wage vs. 
Firing Threats 
0.400 
(0.645) 
0.470 
(0.647) 
0.427 
(0.782) 
0.884 
(0.999) 
0.941 
(0.999) 
0.634 
(0.713) 
0.543 
(0.792) 
 Individual Incentives 
vs. Firing Threats 
0.411 
(0.809) 
0.488 
(0.518) 
0.703 
(0.999) 
0.409 
(0.520) 
0.481 
(0.748) 
0.226 
(0.518) 
0.398 
(0.688) 
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TABLE A.5 P-values for clustered t-tests (clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) 
assessing differences in Internet usage across treatments. 
Treatment Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Subtotal Periods 1 to 4 Period 5 TOTAL 
B 
Subjects 
only 
Fixed Wage vs. 
Individual Incentives 
0.012 
(0.042) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.014) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
Fixed Wage vs. 
Firing Threats 
       
All 10 subjects 
(including fired subjects) 
0.005 
(0.029) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.029) 
(0.191) 
(0.062) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.370 
(0.624) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
Excluding fired 
subjects 
- - 0.000 
(0.016) 
0.000 
(0.018) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.229 
(0.156) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
Individual Incentives 
vs. Firing Threats 
       
All 10 subjects 
(including fired subjects) 
0.753 
(0.695) 
0.322 
(0.773) 
0.189 
(0.337) 
0.001 
(0.040) 
0.079 
(0.248) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
0.267 
(0.411) 
Excluding fired 
subjects 
- - 0.690 
(0.661) 
0.672 
(0.156) 
0.929 
(0.717) 
0.188 
(0.178) 
0.775 
(0.646) 
C 
Subjects 
only 
Fixed Wage vs. 
Individual Incentives 
0.095 
(0.082) 
0.408 
(0.931) 
0.930 
(0.931) 
0.172 
(0.329) 
0.360 
(0.537) 
0.430 
(0.609) 
0.229 
(0.429) 
Fixed Wage vs. 
Firing Threats 
0.009 
(0.034) 
0.585 
(0.931) 
0.690 
(0.999) 
0.428 
(0.662) 
0.328 
(0.537) 
0.624 
(0.690) 
0.345 
(0.429) 
Individual Incentives 
vs. Firing Threats 
0.067 
(0.132) 
0.559 
(0.818) 
0.637 
(0.937) 
0.485 
(0.690) 
0.910 
(0.937) 
0.548 
(0.999) 
0.745 
(0.937) 
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TABLE A.6 P-values for clustered t-tests (clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) 
assessing differences in working time ─or leisure time─ across treatments. 
 Treatment Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Subtotal Periods 1 to 4 Period 5 TOTAL 
B 
Subjects 
only 
Fixed Wage vs. 
Individual Incentives 0.000 (0.003) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
 Fixed Wage vs. 
Firing Threats 
       
 All 10 subjects 
(including fired subjects) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
(0.000) 
(0.010) 
0. 000 
(0.003) 
0.745 
(0.680) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
 Excluding fired 
subjects - - 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.161 
(0.129) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
 Individual Incentives 
vs. Firing Threats 
       
 All 10 subjects 
(including fired subjects) 
0.493 
(0.156) 
0.924 
(0.201) 
0.135 
(0.248) 
0.001 
(0.061) 
0.062 
(0.145) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.020) 
 Excluding fired 
subjects - - 
0.971 
0.574 
0.491 
(0.278) 
0.713 
(0.452) 
0.007 
(0.138) 
0.295 
(0.167) 
C 
Subjects 
only 
Fixed Wage vs. 
Individual Incentives 0.125 (0.004) 
0.130 
(0.126) 
0.223 
(0.126) 
0.142 
(0.126) 
0.131 
(0.082) 
0.832 
(0.762) 
0.138 
(0.082) 
 Fixed Wage vs. 
Firing Threats 
0.707 
(0.662) 
0.763 
(0.931) 
0.505 
(0.999) 
0.631 
(0.931) 
0.739 
(0.931) 
0.798 
(0.762) 
0.668 
(0.931) 
 Individual Incentives 
vs. Firing Threats 
 0.064 
(0.065) 
0.083 
(0.093) 
0.203 
(0.240) 
0.129 
(0.093) 
0.041 
(0.093) 
0.965 
(0.699) 
0.067 
(0.065) 
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TABLE A.7 Tobit regression with random effects for individual productivity 
(periods 1 to 4) across treatments.32 
 Treatment F vs. I Treatment F vs. W 
Intercept -0.016 -0.081** 
Treatment F -0.067*** -0.050** 
Working time 
(in minutes) 0.014*** 0.017*** 
Number of observations 
and 
Log likelihood (L) 
n = 480 
(63 left censored) 
L = -24.777,  
[Prob > χ²] < 0.001 
n = 440 
(76 left censored) 
L = -25.176,  
[Prob > χ²] < 0.001 
Treatment F is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for Treatment F and 0 otherwise 
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01. 
 
 
 
TABLE A.8 Tobit regression with random effects for monitoring time (in seconds).  
 Periods 1-433 Period 5 
Intercept 11.553 -10.867 
Treatment F 115.707** 64.667 
Number of observations 
and 
Log likelihood (L) 
n = 68 
(18 left censored) 
L = -668.2 
[Prob > χ²] = 0.046 
n = 16 
(6 left censored) 
L = -132.0 
[Prob > χ²] = 0.175 
Treatment F is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for Treatment F and 0 otherwise 
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01. 
 
 
  
                                            
32 These results are robust to alternative specifications including non-linear specifications of working time. 
33 These results are robust to introducing period dummies. 
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TABLE A.9 P-values for clustered t-tests (clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) 
assessing differences in individual production and Internet usage across treatments 
and ability levels for periods 1 to 4. 
 Individual production per period 
Internet usage 
per period 
   Low-ability High-ability Low-ability High-ability 
Fixed Wage vs. 
Individual Incentives 
0.012 
(0.051) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
Fixed Wage vs.  
Firing Threats     
All 10 subjects 
(including fired subjects) 
0.068 
(0.376) 
0.014 
(0.021) 
0.015 
(0.022) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
Excluding fired 
subjects 
0.065 
(0.296) 
0.012 
(0.020) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
Individual Incentives 
vs. Firing Threats     
All 10 subjects 
(including fired subjects) 
0.200 
(0.129) 
0.320 
(0.284) 
0.070 
(0.166) 
0.876 
(0.616) 
Excluding fired 
subjects 
0.205 
(0.178) 
0.334 
(0.315) 
0.882 
(0.487) 
0.984 
(0.712) 
 
 
 
TABLE A.10 Tobit regression with random effects for Internet usage per period 
for B subjects only. 
 Fixed Wages  (W) 
Firing 
 (F) 
Individual incentives 
(I) 
Intercept 280.475*** 102.570*** 88.823*** 
Period 2 136.353** -36.681 18.136 
Period 3 136.119** -6.200 27.966 
Period 4 156.514*** 15.515 -2.899 
Period 5 148.247** 117.186*** 33.660 
Number of 
observations 
and 
Log likelihood (L) 
n = 216 
(5 right censored) 
L = -9913.297 
[Prob > χ²] < 0.001 
n = 238 
(0 right censored) 
L = -3206.362 
[Prob > χ²] < 0.001 
n = 270 
(0 right censored) 
L = -3624.998 
[Prob > χ²] = 0.498 
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01. 
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APPENDIX B: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
We build on a two-period model of an organization composed of n workers and a supervisor. 
Workers 
In each period, worker 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 = {1, … , 𝑛} dedicates his or her time to attend either work 
(𝑒௜ ≥ 0) or leisure activities (𝑙௜ ≥ 0) where 𝑒௜ + 𝑙௜ = 𝜑 and 𝜑 > 0 is the total amount of time 
available to workers. We allow for workers who are present at their workstation to dedicate their 
time either to productive (𝑒௜௉ ≥ 0) or nonproductive activities (𝑒௜~௉ ≥ 0) where 𝑒௜ = 𝑒௜௉ + 𝑒௜~௉. 
Only productive effort generates production on the work task (𝑞௜). However, workers may still 
decide to attend their workstation without generating production (𝑒௜~௉ > 0) so as to give their 
supervisor the impression that they prefer the work task to Internet browsing. In that case, the 
worker may either decide to complete the task with minimal effort (e.g. providing random 
answers) or choose not to complete the task at all. We refer to this behavior as impression 
management. 
Definition. Worker i is involved in impression management whenever 𝑒௜~௉ > 0. 
We assume that each worker i possesses a level of ability on the work task denoted by 𝛼௜ ∈
{𝛼௅, 𝛼ு}, with 𝛼௅ <  𝛼ு, which determines the marginal product of the productive effort as 
𝑞௜ = 𝛼௜𝑒௜௉. We assume that ability levels are workers’ private information. We denote by 𝑁௝ ⊂ 𝑁 
the set of workers endowed with ability 𝛼௝, with 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻}. We denote by 𝑛௝ > 0 the number of 
workers endowed with ability 𝛼௝ so that the total number of workers is defined as 𝑛 = 𝑛௅ + 𝑛ு.  
We consider that the cost of productive effort 𝐶(𝑒௜௉) for worker i is such that 𝐶ᇱ(∙) > 0 and 
𝐶ᇱᇱ(∙) > 0. We assume that the nonproductive effort entails no costs save the opportunity costs 
of not producing for cash or enjoying the leisure activity. Also, we denote by 𝑣(𝑙௜) the utility that 
worker i derived from the leisure activity, where 𝑣′(∙) > 0 and 𝑣′′(∙) < 0. In order to keep the 
focus of our analysis on workers’ heterogeneity in abilities, we consider that workers have the 
same cost of effort and the same utility of leisure. We denote by ꙍ the fixed wage received by 
each worker at the beginning of a period. 
Importantly, we consider that regardless of their ability level workers can either be intrinsically 
motivated to complete the work task or not. We assume that a worker’s intrinsic motivation is 
private information. We denote by 𝑛௝,ோ (𝑛௝,~ோ) the number of (not) intrinsically motivated 
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workers of ability 𝛼௝, with 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻}. Intrinsically motivated workers derive direct utility from 
working (Deci (1971, 1975) and Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999)). We denote such utility as 
𝜗(𝑒௜௉), with 𝜗(𝑒௜௉) ≔ 0 for non-intrinsically motivated workers, and with 𝜗(𝑒௜௉) > 0 for 𝑒௜௉ >
0, 𝜗(0) = 0, 𝜗′(∙) > 0 and 𝜗′′(∙) < 0 for intrinsically motivated workers.  
Supervisor 
Each organization is monitored by a supervisor 𝑠 ∉ 𝑁. The supervisor can monitor workers 
and obtain information regarding their production levels (𝑞௜) and their dedication to the work 
task (𝑒௜). However, the supervisor cannot distinguish between productive and nonproductive 
work activities. In addition to monitoring, supervisors can dedicate their time either to work or 
leisure activities so that: 𝑚௦ + 𝑒௦ + 𝑙௦ = 𝜑 where 𝑚௦ is the time dedicated to monitoring 
activities.  For simplicity, we consider two levels of monitoring intensity (𝑚ୱ ϵ {0, 𝑚ഥ} ).34 For 
𝑚௦ =  𝑚ഥ , the supervisor can observe individual production and effort levels while in the absence 
of monitoring (𝑚ୱ =  0), the supervisor can only observe the total production of the 
organization, that is ∑ 𝑞௜௡௜ୀଵ + 𝑞௦, where 𝑞௦ is the supervisor’s production. The cost of 
monitoring activities is specified as follows: 𝐶௠(0) = 0 and 𝐶௠(𝑚ഥ) = 𝑐̅ where 𝑐̅ > 0. In all 
treatments, the supervisor’s own effort is rewarded at its marginal product. 
Now we describe subjects’ utility functions for each treatment: 
Individual Incentives Treatment (Treatment I) 
In the individual incentives treatment, workers’ utility function is described as follows:  
𝑈௜ ≔ ෍ ቂꙍ + 𝛼௜𝑒௜௉(௧) + 𝑣ቀ𝑙௜(௧)ቁ − 𝐶ቀ𝑒௜௉(௧)ቁ + 𝜗ቀ𝑒௜௉(௧)ቁቃ
ଶ
௧ୀଵ
 
and supervisor’s utility function is as follows: 
𝑈௦ ≔ ෍ ቂ𝛼௦𝑒௦௉(௧) + 𝑣ቀ𝑙௦(௧)ቁ − 𝐶ቀ𝑒௦௉(௧)ቁ + 𝜗ቀ𝑒௦௉(௧)ቁ − 𝐶௠ቀ𝑚௦(௧)ቁ − 𝑛ꙍቃ
ଶ
௧ୀଵ
 
Fixed Wage Treatment (Treatment W) 
Similarly, in the fixed wage treatment, workers’ utility function is described as follows:  
                                            
34 We could consider an intermediate level of monitoring for which the supervisor only observes individual 
production. The nature of our results would not be affected by considering such extension. 
 
34 
𝑈௜ ≔ ෍ ቂꙍ + 𝑣ቀ𝑙௜(௧)ቁ − 𝐶ቀ𝑒௜௉(௧)ቁ + 𝜗ቀ𝑒௜௉(௧)ቁቃ
ଶ
௧ୀଵ
 
and supervisor’s utility function is as follows: 
𝑈௦ ≔ ෍ ൥𝛼௦𝑒௦௉(௧) + 𝑣ቀ𝑙௦(௧)ቁ − 𝐶ቀ𝑒௦௉(௧)ቁ + 𝜗ቀ𝑒௦௉(௧)ቁ − 𝐶௠ቀ𝑚௦(௧)ቁ + ෍ 𝑞௜(௧)
௜ఢே
− 𝑛ꙍ൩
ଶ
௧ୀଵ
 
Firing Treatment (Treatment F) 
In the firing treatment, the first period corresponds to a probationary period at the end of 
which, and after having paid workers’ wages, the supervisor can fire 𝑛௙ workers where 
𝑛௙𝜖൛0,1, … , 𝑛ത௙ൟ and 𝑛ത௙ ≤ 𝑛. We denote 𝑁ி the set of fired workers. In the second period, which 
can be seen as a tenure period, the workers who were not fired at the end of the first period will 
receive the same fixed wage ꙍ > 0 as in the first period. Fired workers will not receive any fixed 
wage and will not be able to produce anymore. Workers will not have the opportunity to work in 
another organization in the second period. This cost of being fired can be seen as temporary 
unemployment. In that setting, the utility function for worker i can be described as follows:  
𝑈௜ ≔ ꙍ + 𝑣ቀ𝑙௜(ଵ)ቁ − 𝐶ቀ𝑒௜௉(ଵ)ቁ + 𝜗ቀ𝑒௜௉(ଵ)ቁ 
+(1 − 𝜋௜) ቄꙍ + 𝑣ቀ𝑙௜(ଶ)ቁ − 𝐶ቀ𝑒௜௉(ଶ)ቁ + 𝜗ቀ𝑒௜௉(ଶ)ቁቅ + 𝜋௜𝑣ቀ𝑙௜(ଶ)ቁ 
where 𝜋௜ is the probability for worker i to be fired at the end of the first period. Supervisor’s 
utility function is as follows: 
𝑈௦ ≔ ෍ ቂ𝛼௦𝑒௦௉(௧) + 𝑣ቀ𝑙௦(௧)ቁ − 𝐶ቀ𝑒௦௉(௧)ቁ + 𝜗ቀ𝑒௦௉(௧)ቁ − 𝐶௠ቀ𝑚௦(௧)ቁቃ
ଶ
௧ୀଵ
 
+ ෍ 𝑞௝(ଵ)
௝ఢே
− 𝑛ꙍ + ෍ 𝑞௝(ଶ)
௝ఢே∖ேಷ
− ൫𝑛 − 𝑛௙൯ꙍ 
We derive our conjectures using the following specification of the model: 𝐶(𝑒௜௉) = ൫௘೔
ು൯మ
ଶ , 
𝑣(𝑙௜) = 𝛽𝑙௜ and for intrinsically motivated subjects we assume that 𝜗(𝑒௜௉) = 𝛾𝑒௜௉, where 𝛽 > 0 
and 𝛾 > 0. We provide details of our derivations in Appendix 1 online.  
  
